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5 
Problems and Recommendations 
European Cyber Security Policy 
European security policy is changing in fundamental 
ways. The old threat scenario involving tank divisions 
from the East has been replaced by the challenge 
posed by invisible adversaries whose geographical 
source can often not be determined. Virtual attacks 
threatening critical infrastructure, government insti-
tutions and personal data form one of the key chal-
lenges to security policy in the 21st century. A secure 
Internet is essential to the protection of individual 
liberties, the right to informational self-determination 
and democracy as a whole. 
The gradually developing European cyber security 
policy tries to establish minimum standards in all 
EU member states with regard to prevention, resil-
ience and international cooperation. It aims to foster 
national security without compromising democratic 
principles or unduly violating individual liberties. 
However, it is hard to find a balance between these 
goals, and the EU’s measures thus inevitably raise 
questions about the democratic implications of Euro-
pean cyber security policy: are the institutional struc-
tures and instruments of European cyber security 
policy compatible with the criteria of democratic 
governance? In order to answer this question, this 
study first outlines the main challenges related to the 
promotion of Internet security. After that, the study 
presents the institutional architecture of global cyber 
security policy and identifies the key principles of 
organisation behind European cyber security policy. 
In conclusion, the study assesses how compatible the 
institutional framework of European cyber security 
policy is with democratic criteria and discusses ways 
to enhance cyber security without endangering demo-
cratic principles. The study does not deal with the 
military or the legal dimension of data protection, 
technical aspects of internet regulation or the domes-
tic political discourses in EU member states. 
It is worthwhile to take a closer look at the EU, 
because the Union forms something of an institu-
tional laboratory. What is tried out in the Union today 
could well be implemented at the international level 
in the future. Like the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy 
before it, the Union’s nascent cyber security strategy 
could thus become a focal point of international regu-
lation and an important instrument for inner-Euro-
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6 
pean coordination. In other words, the EU’s policies 
represent a model for the future of global regulation. 
European cyber security policy is closely linked to 
both international and national regulatory processes. 
Put differently, European cyber security policy is for-
mulated and implemented in a global multi-level, 
multi-stakeholder structure. This poses three central 
problems for democratic governance: 
The blurring of the boundaries between internal and exter-
nal policies: In the area of cyber security, it is almost 
impossible to maintain the traditional division into 
internal and external policies. Internet-based attacks 
can originate in Ghana, Russia or right next door, 
and it is often difficult (if not impossible) to identify 
the source of the attack. As a result, the boundaries 
between justice and home affairs policy on the one 
hand and foreign policy on the other become in-
creasingly blurred. Threats can no longer be clearly 
defined as belonging to the area of responsibility of 
either policy field. A visible sign of this development 
is the increasing level of cooperation between authori-
ties and institutions responsible for different policy 
fields. This erosion of traditional roles is more prob-
lematic in the EU than it is in the national context, 
but it is by no means a new phenomenon. In the last 
years, the development of European security policy 
has largely been driven by an internationalisation of 
the EU’s justice and home affairs policy, whereas the 
role of the CFSP in cyber security policy is limited to 
the actions of the five dominant member states (Ger-
many, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and 
Sweden). In this new political structure, both the Euro-
pean Commission and the European Parliament gain 
new possibilities for influencing the policy-making 
process. 
Securitisation: The EU used to have the goal to create 
a common “area of freedom, security and justice”. 
However, at the face of new threats, the Commission 
and the member states tend to emphasize security 
over freedom, stressing the importance of introducing 
new security policy measures. In addition, private 
security companies have gained more and more in-
fluence in this policy field. 
Privatisation of governance: Also the traditional dis-
tinction between the private sector and the public 
sector is increasingly fading in the emerging political 
structure. Without the technological expertise of 
private companies, it is difficult to identify the rele-
vant threats and respond to them accordingly. Many 
private companies are also responsible for critical 
infrastructure in energy, health or transportation. 
Involving these companies in risk and crisis manage-
ment as well as threat identification processes is a 
decisive part of maintaining public safety, which, on 
the other hand, has to be guaranteed by the institu-
tions that have a constitutional mandate to do so. 
To ensure the compatibility of the institutional 
structure and instruments of European cyber security 
policy with the principles of democratic governance, 
the following guidelines can be formulated: “Good 
governance” in European cyber security policy 
should meet such criteria as transparency, rule of law, 
accountability and participation. The constructive 
role of national parliaments in the institutional and 
material regulation of European cyber security policy 
is of particular importance, as parliaments are respon-
sible for the communication with the general public. 
In democratic structures, parliaments should be the 
place where the relationship between security and 
freedom is being defined – especially when it comes 
to cyber security policy. 
The negotiations over the International Convention 
on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 
made it clear that exclusive, opaque politics will lead 
to no results. Non-governmental groups such as repre-
sentatives of the Internet industry, the civil society or 
the technical community should be included in politi-
cal decision-making processes. This way, European co-
ordination would follow the established principles of 
the internet culture: it would be “open”, not “closed”, 
“bottom up” instead of “top down” and “inclusive”, 
not “exclusive”. 
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7 
Challenges Facing the Market and the State 
 
One of the central problems for cyber security policy is 
that in the EU there exists no systematic, quantitative 
scheme to detect and disseminate information about 
cyber security threats.1 Neither national nor inter-
national institutions have the technical capabilities or 
the legal competences required to register all Internet-
based attacks on businesses, government agencies and 
private accounts.2 Any assessment of the nature and 
degree of cyber risk will thus largely have to rely on 
expert analysis and government reports.3
These reports commonly divide cyber security 
threats into three categories: cybercrime, cyber espio-
nage and cyber war.
 
4
 
1  For more information on building cyber security scenar-
ios, see Tessier Stall, The Future of Cybersecurity, Den Haag: The 
Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and TNO, 2011. For an 
overview of the system of cyberspace, see Shmuel Even and 
David Siman-Tov, Cyber Warfare: Concepts and Strategic Trends 
(Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, May 2012). 
 The international community 
2  The action plan implementing the Stockholm Programme 
calls for the establishment of an Observatory for the Preven-
tion of Crime (OPC), but the OPC will not be operational until 
2013. Cf. David Brown, “The Stockholm Solution? Papering 
over the Cracks within the Area of Freedom, Security and Jus-
tice”, European Security 20, no. 4 (December 2011) 4: 481–503. 
3  For recent reports, see Alexander Klimburg and Heli Tir-
maa-Klaar, Cybersecurity and Cyberpower: Concepts, Conditions 
and Capabilities for Cooperation for Action within the EU, a study 
requested by the European Parliament, PE 433.828 (Brussels, 
April 2011), 54. See also Myriam Dunn Cavelty, “The Militari-
sation of Cyber Security as a Source of Global Tension”, in 
Strategic Trends 2012: Key Developments in Global Affairs, ed. Daniel 
Möckli (Zurich: Center for Strategic Studies [CSS], ETH Zurich, 
2012), 103–24. 
4  In the literature, the following four categories are often 
used: “Cyberwar – Warfare in cyberspace. This includes war-
fare attacks against a nation’s military – forcing critical com-
munications channels to fail, for example – and attacks 
against the civilian population. Cyberterrorism – The use of 
cyberspace to commit terrorist acts. An example might be 
hacking into a computer system to cause a nuclear power 
plant to melt down, a dam to open, or two airplanes to col-
lide. […] Cybercrime – Crime in cyberspace. This includes 
much of what we’ve already experienced: theft of intellectual 
property, extortion based on the threat of DDOS attacks, 
fraud based on identity theft, and so on. Cybervandalism – 
The script kiddies who deface websites for fun are techni-
cally criminals, but I think of them more as vandals or 
hooligans”. Bruce Schneier, Schneier on Security (Blog), http:// 
has so far failed to reach a consensus on a definition 
of these three concepts. However, cybercrime can be 
defined roughly as involving offences against property 
rights of non-state actors (e.g. phishing),5 whereas 
cyber espionage stands for breaches in the databases 
of governmental or non-state enterprises by foreign 
government agencies. The term cyber war covers 
attempts of a state to harm another state by attacking 
it via the Internet. However, all of these working 
definitions remain ambiguous.6 There are, further-
more, no clearly defined political or legal boundaries 
for differentiating between cybercrime, cyber espio-
nage and cyber war, which makes classification all 
the more difficult.7
The lack of international consensus on definitions 
of cyber offences is not the result of disputes over tech-
nical and legal subtleties, but reflects a fundamental 
disagreement regarding the appropriateness and 
proper scope of government regulation in this policy 
field.
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www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/06/cyberwar.html 
(accessed on 22 March 2012). 
 While some support the idea of establishing a 
5  Phishing refers to the fraudulent acquisition of (or the 
attempt to acquire) sensitive information such as passwords 
or credit card information using electronic communications, 
whereby perpetrators impersonate trusted persons. 
6  For an overview of different definitions of cybercrime, see 
Neil Robinson et al., Feasibility Study for a European Cybercrime 
Centre, prepared by RAND Europe for the European Commis-
sion (Brussels, 2012), 17–55. 
7  Cf. Alexander Klimburg, “Mobilising Cyber Power”, Survival 
53, no. 1 (February–March 2011): 41–60; Friedrich Wilhelm 
Kriesel and David Kriesel, “Cyberwar – relevant für Sicherheit 
und Gesellschaft? Eine Problemanalyse”, Zeitschrift für Außen- 
und Sicherheitspolitik 5, no. 4 (2011): 205–16 (214). 
8  According to Kleinwächter, “three layers play a role in 
Internet regulation: the transport layer, i.e. the telecommu-
nications infrastructure, that is regulated by national tele-
communications law as well as by international treaties 
negotiated in the framework of the ITU; the protocol layer – 
in the stricter sense, ‘the Internet’ with its codes, standards, 
IP addresses and domain name systems – that is regulated 
by non-governmental global institutions such as the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), the World Wide Web Consor-
tium (W3C), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engi-
neers (IEEE), the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN) or the Regional Internet Registries 
(RIRs); the application layer – i.e. all web-based services from 
Challenges Facing the Market and the State 
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8 
centralised intergovernmental organisation for Inter-
net oversight, others favour a decentralised, multi-
stakeholder governance model based on equal partner-
ship between government, private sector, civil society, 
and technical experts.9 These fundamental differences 
of opinion have been clearly visible in the recent 
debate over the extradition and prosecution of Wiki-
leaks founder Julian Assange, in the dispute over the 
International Agreement on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA),10
All three examples involve both inter-state and 
national debates about the limits of legitimate state 
intervention and the boundaries of individual rights. 
In the Wikileaks case, the US prosecutors defined the 
publication of stolen, classified government docu-
ments as a felony, which resulted in the forfeiture of 
Wikileaks’ organisational address (.org). This action 
was followed shortly thereafter by similar bans in 
Switzerland and Sweden. Those critical of the US 
attempts to shut down the website argue that Wiki-
leaks is a neutral medium of information dissemina-
tion and should as such not be punished regardless 
of who uses it or for what purposes it is used.
 as well as in the on-going quar-
rels about data mining practices. 
11
While corporate-interest groups hold that ACTA is 
necessary to protect intellectual property, the grand 
majority of the Internet public – consisting of home 
users as well as Internet-freedom advocates – perceive 
government measures in this area as a threat to the 
freedom on the Internet.
 
12
 
e-commerce to social networks, which are primarily regu-
lated by national law and, furthermore, by constitutional 
law, including freedom of expression and protection of 
property and privacy”. Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Wie reguliert 
man den Cyberspace? Die Quadratur des Dreiecks”, Heise On-
line – Telepolis, 29 May 2012, http://www.heise.de/tp/druck/mb/ 
artikel/34/34742/1.html (accessed on 2 June 2012; quote trans-
lated by T. I.-M.). 
 In a similar encounter, 
9  Cf. Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Kalter Krieg im Cyberspace 
oder konstruktiver Dialog? Ausblick auf die Internetpolitik 
2012”, Heise Online – Telepolis, 20 January 2012, http://www. 
heise.de/tp/druck/mb/artikel/36/36266/1.html (accessed on 17 
March 2012). 
10  For more information, see The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA): an Assessment, a study requested by the Euro-
pean Parliament, PE 433.859 (Brussels, 2011). 
11  Cf. Geert Lovink and Patrice Riemens, “Die Anarchie der 
Transparenz”, Frankfurter Rundschau, 7 December 2010: 32; 
see also François Heisbourg, “Leaks and Lessons”, Survival 53, 
no. 1 (February–March 2011): 207–16. 
12  For an excellent overview of this debate, see “Acta-Exe-
gese: Ist es nun das Ende des freien Internet oder nicht?”, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (online version), 23 February 
attempts by the EU to impose a directive on data 
retention met with strong resistance in Germany. The 
Federal Constitutional Court rejected the German 
Federal Diet’s (Bundestag) measures transposing the 
EU directive by arguing that these infringed the right 
to secrecy of telecommunications (for a more detailed 
discussion of this case, see the section “Securitisa-
tion”). 
Considering the lack of conceptual clarity, it makes 
little sense to use the terms crime, espionage and war. 
A more practicable solution is to draw a distinction 
between threats to national security on the one hand 
and threats to the functioning of the market economy 
as well as offenses against private property on the 
other. 
Offenses against Private Property 
The Internet enables a wide variety of criminal actions 
that aim at the appropriation of property.13 Instru-
ments such as identity theft, phishing, spam and mali-
cious code have rendered large-scale fraud offenses 
increasingly commonplace.14
 
2012, http://www.faz.net/aktu ell/feuilleton/medien/acta-
exegese-ist-es-nun-das-ende-des-freien-internet-oder-nicht-
11660030.html (accessed on 23 February 2012). 
 Financial losses from 
13  According to the European Commission, cybercrime com-
prises all “criminal acts committed using electronic commu-
nications networks and information systems or against such 
networks and systems”. European Commission, Communica-
tion from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a General 
Policy on the Fight against Cyber Crime, COM (2007) 267 final 
(Brussels, 22 May 2007). 
14  The European Commission categorises cyber threats as 
follows: “exploitation purposes, such as ‘advanced persistent 
threats’ for economic and political espionage purposes (e.g. 
GhostNet), identity theft, the recent attacks against the Emis-
sions Trading System or against government IT systems; dis-
ruption purposes, such as Distributed Denial of Service attacks 
or spamming generated via botnets (e.g. the Conficker net-
work of 7 million machines or the Spanish-based Mariposa 
network of 12.7 million machines), Stuxnet and cut-off of 
communication means; destruction purposes. This is a scenario 
that has not yet materialised but, given the increasing per-
vasiveness of ICT [information and communications technol-
ogy, added by the author] in Critical Infrastructure (e.g. smart 
grids and water systems), it cannot be ruled out for the years 
to come.” Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions on Critical Information Infrastruc-
ture Protection. Achievements and Next Steps: Towards Global Cyber-
security, COM(2011) 163 final (31 March 2011): 3–4. 
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9 
identity theft as well as from fraudulent criminal 
practices targeting online banking and credit cards 
are growing rapidly. According to the crime statistics 
of the German police, approximately 38,000 criminal 
cases of this kind were reported in 2008. In 2010, the 
number of cases had risen to 60,000 and the losses 
amounted to 60 million euro.15
In a recent study, IT security company McAfee 
reported that 36 per cent of the business leaders, sci-
entists and policy makers surveyed by the company 
in 27 European countries considered defence against 
cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure (e.g. utilities, 
banks, insurance, transportation) as important as 
missile defence.
 
16 Furthermore, 43 per cent of the 
respondents reported that hackers had attempted to 
damage their organisation’s critical infrastructure. 
In the previous year’s study, only 37 per cent of the 
respondents reported having fallen victim to such 
attacks.17 The so called “Cyber Security Risks Report” 
published by Hewlett-Packard’s Digital Vaccine Labora-
tories (DVLabs) underscores this trend.18
According to the European Commission, one mil-
lion people become victims of Internet crime daily.
 According to 
the report, the first half of 2011 saw over 65 per cent 
more attacks on web applications than the first half of 
the previous year. The complexity of the attacks is also 
increasing, thus eroding the confidence of the major-
ity of surveyed executives in their own IT security sys-
tems. Less than 30 per cent of executives believe that 
their own IT systems are well protected from attack. 
19
 
15  Cf. Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation, Cybercrime: 
Bundeslagebild 2010, p. 6, http://www.bka.de/nn_193360/DE/ 
Publikationen/Jahresberi chteUndLagebilder/Cybercrime/ 
cybercrime__node.html?__nnn=true (accessed on June 21, 
2012); for a recent estimation, see “Cyber Criminals Steal 
Millions from EU Banks”, EUObserver, 27 June 2012. 
 
This number includes online fraud, spam and emails 
from scammers asking for account information. Illegal 
websites sell credit card details for as little as one euro 
per card, whereas fake credit cards are available for 
EUR 140 and stolen bank account data for only EUR 
60. Each day, some 600,000 Facebook accounts are 
16  Cf. Brigid Grauman, Cybersecurity: The Vexed Question of 
Global Rules (Brussels: Security and Defence Agenda, February 
2012). 
17  Cf. Jens Koenen, “Das Wettrüsten für den Cyber-War ist 
in vollem Gange”, Handelsblatt, 31 January 2012: 23. 
18  Cf. Secure Your Network. 2010 Full Year Top Cyber Security Risks 
Report, ed. Hewlett-Packard DVLabs (March 2011). 
19  The number is based on a press release of the European 
Commission, An EU Cyber Crime Centre to Fight Online Criminals 
and E-consumers, IP/12/317 (Brussels, 28 March 2012). 
blocked to prevent hackers from gaining entry. In 
2009 alone, it was calculated that more than 6.7 mil-
lion computers were infected with bots.20
According to the Internet security company McAfee, 
companies from the US and Europe suffer each year 
an estimated $ 1 trillion in damages when lost busi-
ness, worthless research and development as well as 
additional spending on cyber defence are all counted 
together. Furthermore, the experiences of Sony and 
Adidas illustrate that also the public image of com-
panies is vulnerable to cyber-attack. In April 2011, 
anonymous perpetrators managed to gain access to 
the information of more than 100 million of Sony’s 
online customers. When Adidas fell victim to a similar 
attack in 2011, it was forced to take its website offline 
in an effort to protect customer data. 
 
The pervasiveness of the problem is underscored by 
the estimate that there are currently about 30,000 vul-
nerability analysts selling their expertise to concerned 
producers and global organised crime syndicates.21 In 
recent years, the European internal market and par-
ticularly Germany have become popular targets for 
cybercrime. However, according to the German gov-
ernment22 and leading German business representa-
tives, many medium-sized companies are insufficient-
ly aware of the risks that arise from cyber criminality 
and the unwanted outflow of critical expertise.23
 
20  Cf. ibid. Bots or botnets (short for robot network) are 
networks of compromised computers that can be controlled 
remotely and used for conducting coordinated attacks. 
 
This lack of awareness contrasts strongly with the 
increasing importance of cyber security issues to all 
modern service economies and, thus, to all EU mem-
21  Michael Spehr, “Angriff auf IT-Systeme: Das Spiel der 
Hacker”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 May 2011. 
22  Interview with the Federal Minister of Interior Hans-Peter 
Friedrich, “‘Cyberangriffe werden weiter zunehmen’”, Han-
delsblatt, 3 February 2012: 17. 
23  “Within a few minutes, a single employee with access to 
relevant data could copy all the information stored by a com-
pany on a USB flash drive and pass it on. [...] [I]nformation is 
still disseminated above all by people [...]. ‘A uniform cor-
porate culture and clear ethical guidelines provide protec-
tion’ [...]”, says Daimler’s Head of corporate security, Sabine 
Wiedemann. See “Daimler-Sicherheitschefin Sabine Wiede-
mann referiert über Wirtschafts- und Industriespionage 
beim Neujahrsempfang des CDU-Kreisverbandes Enzkreis/ 
Pforzheim”, Website of Gunther Krichbaum, Member of the German 
Bundestag and the Christian Democratic Union, http://www. 
gunther-krichbaum.de/nc/startseite/aktuell/artikel/daimler-
sicherheitschefin-sabine-wiedemann-referiert-ueber-
wirtschafts-und-industriespionage-beim-n.html (accessed 
on 30 March 2012, quote translated by T. I.-M.). 
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ber states. Modern service economies are characterised 
by complex and interconnected modes of production. 
As a result, they are highly dependent on both a safe, 
Internet-based communication infrastructure and an 
effective protection of intellectual property. Secure 
modes of communication are the prerequisite for 
organising the different production phases, for trans-
ferring knowledge and for structuring the production 
chain. A significant proportion of the public infra-
structure and services are also connected to the Inter-
net and thus highly vulnerable to cyber-attacks.24
Challenges to National Security 
 
The Internet also bears a wide variety of risks to 
national security. Since 2005, both federal agencies 
and industrial firms have experienced an increase in 
the number of attacks involving spy trojans.25 At the 
2011 Munich Security Conference, then-German 
Minister of Interior Thomas de Maizière revealed that 
the German government network is attacked four to 
five times a day by foreign intelligence services.26 The 
problem of cyber espionage is exasperated by the fact 
that a number of states use cyber-attacks as a means 
to gather information.27 In all probability, also the 
German authorities use the Internet to systematically 
collect data from other states. According to FOCUS, 
the Federal Intelligence Service BND has infiltrated 
90 computers in Afghanistan and in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.28
 
24  For an overview of national policies that aim at protect-
ing critical infrastructures, see Elgin M. Brunner and Manuel 
Suter, International CIIP Handbook 2008/2009. An Inventory of 
25 National and 7 International Critical Information Infrastructure 
Protection Policies (Zurich: CSS, 2008). 
 In order to perform cyber 
espionage operations, governments increasingly co-
operate with private hacker groups that are able to 
break into corporate databases and steal strategically 
important knowledge. Experts estimate that there are 
25  See Deutscher Bundestag, Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten 
Jan Korte u.a.: Auskunft über Einsatz staatlicher Schadprogramme 
zur Computerspionage (“Staatstrojaner”), Drucksache 17/7104 
(25 October 2011). 
26  Cf. Paul-Anton Krüger, “Wettrüsten im virtuellen Raum”, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 7 February 2011; Jens Koenen et al., “Der 
Verteidigungsfall im Netz. Computerviren in der Hand von 
Terroristen”, Handelsblatt, 27 January 2012: 21. 
27  For a lengthier discussion of this problem, see Klimburg, 
“Mobilising Cyber Power” (see note 7). 
28  Hubert Gude, “Geheimdienst: Trojaner im Dienst”, Focus, 
23 March 2009. 
hundreds of millions of malicious programs and more 
than 100 organisations that participate in military, 
intelligence or cyber terrorist operations.29
All such actions are generally subsumed under the 
heading cyber war.
 
30 Broadly defined, cyber war refers 
to all state actions that make use of internet-based 
instruments and aim at damaging another state.31 
When asked whether we are in cyber war, former CIA 
director Michael Hayden said: “That depends on the 
definition. For sure there is a national power struggle 
on the Internet. But most of it is spying, not war.”32 
Currently, cyber warfare is conducted using botnets 
and worms. One of the most prominent botnet attacks 
took place in 2007, as a large a number of infected 
computers simultaneously requested access to the 
Estonian government servers, overrunning the servers’ 
capacities and making the network temporarily un-
available. In March 2009, a network of compromised 
computers attacked the computer systems of govern-
ment and private organisations in over 100 countries, 
accessing sensitive and confidential documents.33
The best-known case of a state-on-state attack by 
means of information technology became public in 
July 2010, as a malicious program now known as Stux-
net was discovered. It was widely speculated that Israel 
and the US used the software in an effort to disrupt 
 
Similar attacks have occurred also in Malta (in 2004) 
and in Georgia during the conflict between Georgia 
and Russia in 2008. 
 
29  Numbers presented by Peter W. Singer, “Schlachtfelder 
der Zukunft”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 February 2011. 
30  The following authors explicitly use the term cyberwar: 
Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, World Wide War. Angriff 
aus dem Internet (Hamburg, 2011); Sandro Gaycken, Cyberwar. 
Das Internet als Kriegsschauplatz (München, 2010); Id., Cyberwar. 
Das Wettrüsten hat längst begonnen. Vom digitalen Angriff zum 
realen Ausnahmezustand (München, 2012). 
31  See Jason Healey, Beyond Attribution: Seeking National Respon-
sibility for Cyber Attacks (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council of 
the United States, January 2012); for an introduction into 
the legal dimension of cyber security policy, see Eneken Tikk, 
“Ten Rules for Cyber Security”, Survival 53, no. 3 (June–July 
2011): 119–32; for the strategic debate, see Paul Cornish et al., 
On Cyber Warfare, Chatham House Report (London: The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 2010), 25–34. 
32  Cited in Christian Wernicke, “Spionage ist kein Krieg. Der 
ehemalige CIA-Chef Hayden warnt vor Cyber-Attacken, aber 
auch vor Hysterie”, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 September 2010: 
7 (quote translated by T. I.-M.). 
33  Cf. European Commission, Commission to Boost Europe’s 
Defences against Cyber-attacks, IP/10/1239 (Brussels, 30 Septem-
ber 2010). 
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the Iranian nuclear program.34 Complex, discerning 
and adaptive, the Stuxnet virus required not only 
technical expertise but also significant human and 
financial resources to develop. Stuxnet is unlikely to 
remain an isolated case. It is estimated that there are 
some 100 state-sponsored and non-governmental 
teams world-wide attempting to replicate Stuxnet in 
order to device similar infrastructure-attacking mal-
ware.35 In May 2012, IT experts identified a new 
malware known as Flame, Flamer or Skywiper. This 
virus has most likely been utilised ever since August 
2010, and was originally developed by a state. 
According to estimates, thousands of computers above 
all in the Middle East have been infected by the virus 
that causes no physical damage but is able to collect 
enormous amounts of sensitive data. Rumours sug-
gesting that the virus was created in Israel have never 
been officially denied.36 Sutxnet and Flame are text-
book examples “of the Janus-faced nature of conduct-
ing research on security vulnerabilities”37
The US Cyber Command, a department responsible 
for the digital national defence, now has more than 
90,000 employees and a budget of about $ 3 million, 
whereas the US Army boasts of its capacity to disrupt 
the electrical grid of any city in the world through 
cyber-attacks.
 and an im-
pressive example of the new offensive capabilities that 
many states are seeking to acquire. 
38
 
34  Farwell and Rohozinski hint that they believe Israel and 
the US stand behind these attacks. Cf. James P. Farwell and 
Rafal Rohozinski, “Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War”, Sur-
vival 53, no. 1 (February–March 2011): 23–40; David E. Sanger, 
“Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks against Iran”, 
New York Times, 1 June 2012; cf. id., The Inheritance. The World 
Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power (New York: 
Random House, 2012; forthcoming). 
 In case of an armed conflict, informa-
tion warfare is destined to play a key role, as almost 
all military capabilities now rely in one way or an-
other on information technology. As a result, conflicts 
between major powers are unlikely to be limited to 
operations on conventional battlefield. Sandro 
Gaycken underlines the significance of information 
technology for modern warfare by pointing out that 
35  Uwe Proll, “Nach A-Waffen die IT-Waffen. Stuxnet ver-
ändert die globale Sicherheitsarchitektur”, Behörden Spiegel 
(November 2010): 1. 
36  Cf. “Computerschädling Flame: Experten enttarnen neue 
Cyberwaffe”, Spiegel Online, 28 May 2012; “Cyber-Attacke: Israel 
preist Spionage-Virus Flame”, Spiegel Online, 29 May 2012. 
37  Frank Rieger, “Stuxnet: Angriff ist besser als Verteidi-
gung”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 January 2011 (quote 
translated by T. I.-M.). 
38  Cited in Proll, “Nach A-Waffen die IT-Waffen” (see note 35). 
“in a way, cyber warfare enables the return of war 
despite the impossibility of major conventional con-
flicts”.39
 
 
 
 
39  Interview with Sandro Gaycken, “Mit Cyber-Kriegen lassen 
sich geostrategische Ziele realisieren”, Zeit Online, 8 February 
2012 (quote translated by T. I.-M.). 
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The Multi-Level and Multi-Stakeholder Structure of 
Cyber Security Policy 
 
Considering the cyber security challenges facing 
European economies and states, the question that 
inevitably arises is how to incorporate cyber security 
policy into the institutional structure of the EU. Cur-
rently, governance in the area of cyber security is 
characterised by a certain duality. As far as regulatory 
issues are concerned, the European approach is gen-
erally liberal, meaning that private actors are en-
couraged to participate in the process. However, when 
it comes to questions of national security, there is a 
clear emphasis on the role of the state. Another char-
acteristic feature of European cyber security policy is 
the plurality of actors. This plurality reveals not only 
the dynamic nature of the challenge but also the 
lack of clearly delineated areas of responsibility and 
accountability among the different institutions. In 
practice, cyber security policy has thus resorted to the 
“multi-stakeholder” model, where any group with the 
relevant expertise (businesses) or the required political 
authority (states) may participate in the policy-shaping 
process. In order to formulate guidelines for regulat-
ing the Internet in a manner that is both effective and, 
above all, legitimate, it is indispensable to know more 
about the international, regional and national actors 
that participate in shaping European cyber security 
policy. 
National Level 
Although the Internet is a highly unbounded space, 
legal and security responsibilities remain within the 
jurisdiction of the nation-state. Only at the national 
level is it possible to define cyber offenses, initiate law 
enforcement operations and punish offenders.40
 
40  For a comparison of national cyber security strategies, see 
Alexander Seger, Cybercrime Strategies, Discussion paper (Stras-
bourg: Council of Europe, 14 October 2011). 
 It is 
also the national level that links European and inter-
national regulatory processes to the democratic dis-
course, as public debates take place within the nation-
state. Last but not least, it is the nation-state that 
possesses the competences and means to guarantee 
national security. Against this background, it is under-
standable that delicate questions concerning issues 
such as electronic surveillance methods are discussed 
in the national context. 
 In recent years, all OECD states have intensified their 
efforts to improve the protection of state institutions 
and private enterprises from Internet-based attacks.41
China and Russia are often mentioned as states that 
either tolerate or even actively support cyber-attacks 
on foreign government agencies, businesses and criti-
cal infrastructure.
 
The United States plays a leading role here: the Obama 
Administration has declared cyber security a strategic 
priority for defence and homeland security policy. 
Such policy commitments are not without financial 
backing, either. According to some estimates, the US 
government will spend 30 billion dollars on cyber 
security issues over the next five years alone. There is 
also a public debate in the US, including legislative 
proposals in 2010 and 2011, about the development 
of a so called Internet “kill switch” that would entrust 
the President with the ability to shut down portions of 
the US internet in order to protect critical infrastruc-
ture. In Europe, such possibility has so far not been 
discussed. Due to the fact that the biggest European 
carrier networks (Deutsche Telekom, France Télécom, 
British Telecom und Telefónica) are integrated across 
national boundaries, establishing a similar “kill 
switch” would require close cooperation and coordi-
nation between several states. 
42 German Federal Minister of Inte-
rior Hans-Peter Friedrich claims that there is clear 
evidence “that many cyber-attacks can be traced to an 
IP address within the Chinese address space”.43
 
41  The US Government, for example, wants to introduce 
the new “Einstein 3” defence system. This system should 
assist in protecting infrastructures that are essential to the 
US economy and allow for the real-time detection of intru-
sion attempts. Cf. Ulrich Hottelet, “Digitale Aufrüstung”, 
Die Zeit, 2 February 2012: 22. 
 Even 
42  See for example Richard Clarke, “China’s Cyberassault 
on America”, The Wall Street Journal, 15 June 2011; Mike 
McConnell, Michael Chertoff and William Lynn, “China’s 
Cyber Thievery Is National Policy – and Must Be Challenged”, 
The Wall Street Journal, 27 January 2012. 
43  Cf. “Bundesinnenminister Friedrich zur Cybersicherheit: 
‘Es ist richtig, die Alarmglocken zu läuten’”, Stern, 15 March 
2012 (quote translated by T. I.-M.). 
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the German government itself has become target of 
attacks from China. The National Security Agency 
(NSA) of the United States also lists Chinese computers 
as a common origin for espionage on US businesses 
and government agencies. Russia is accused on similar 
grounds. By contrast, it seems that Islamic fundamen-
talism does not currently play a central role in rela-
tion to cybercrime.44
Recognising the increased threat, also Germany 
attempts to improve its cyber defence capabilities.
 
45
Bundesamt für Ver-
fassungsschutz
 
In 2010, the conference of the German Ministers of 
the Interior approved a strategy to combat cybercrime. 
The strategy aims at fostering information exchange 
between public agencies and private stakeholders, 
enhancing crime control and increasing the respon-
sibility of software providers and developers. The 
strategy also emphasises the importance of enhancing 
the skills of private and professional users. Exercises 
like LÜKEX 2011 as well as Germany’s participation in 
the US-initiated Cyber Storm exercise in 2010 or the 
Eurocybex 2010 represent concrete steps on this road. 
The coalition agreement between CDU, CSU and FDP 
also includes measures for improving cyber security. 
These include the expansion of the Federal Office for 
Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik, BSI) that is to become a central 
cyber security agency. In addition, all governmental 
cyber security competences are to be put into the 
hands of the Federal Government Commissioner for 
Information Technology. Furthermore, in February 
2011 the federal government adopted a national cyber 
security strategy that includes an important institu-
tional innovation, the National Cyber Defense Center 
(Nationales Cyber-Abwehrzentrum, NCAZ). The NCAZ 
integrates the capabilities of several agencies such as 
the Federal Office for Information Security, the Fed-
eral Bureau of Criminal Investigation (Bundeskrimi-
nalamt), the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundes-
nachrichtendienst, BND), the Federal Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution (
, BfV), the Federal Office for Citizen 
 
44  For a discussion of cyber-jihad, see Asiem El Difraoui, 
jihad.de. Jihadistische Online-Propaganda: Empfehlungen für Gegen-
maßnahmen in Deutschland, SWP Research Paper 5/2012 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2012; availabe 
only in German), 22ff. 
45  For more information on the implementation of German 
cyber security policy, see Klaus-Dieter Fritsche, Cyber-Sicherheit. 
Die Sicherheitsstrategie der Bundesregierung, Analysen und Argu-
mente 89 (Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, March 
2011). 
Protection and Disaster Support (Bundesamt für Bevöl-
kerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe, BBK), the Feder-
al Police, the Customs Investigation Bureau (Zollkrimi-
nalamt, ZKA) and the Federal Defence Forces (Bundes-
wehr). The Federal Defence Forces contribute above all 
by bringing in the experiences and expertise of their 
Strategy Reconnaissance Command and, particularly, 
the so called Computer Network Operations unit 
(“Gruppe Computer Netzwerk Operationen”).46 The 
Bundeswehr even confirms that it has an “initial 
capability” to attack “enemy networks”.47
The NCAZ’s capacity to guarantee the security of 
governmental institutions, critical infrastructure 
and private businesses is contingent upon the degree 
to which it is able to combine the expertise and 
resources of the participating institutions. Apart from 
focusing resources, the NCAZ must try to consolidate 
existing knowledge on cyber security issues and take 
care of the communication with other European and 
international bodies. With its meagre staff of ten 
officers, the NCAZ can, however, not be expected to 
identify threats and develop appropriate counter-
measures independently. 
 
The structures of the German cyber security policy 
are a good example of how the formerly sharp distinc-
tion between internal and external security as well as 
the areas of responsibility between different govern-
ment departments become increasingly blurred in this 
complex policy field. Cyber security issues undermine 
both the traditional distinction between civil defence, 
military defence and law enforcement on the one 
hand and the traditionally strict separation between 
public authorities and private enterprise on the other. 
The blurring of the boundaries between the public 
and the private sector is particularly evident in the ef-
forts to build so called Computer Emergency Response 
Teams (CERTs) that gather information about com-
puter attacks, develop plans for dealing with them 
and establish defence measures.48
 
46  The technical and operative centre is be supported by 
a national cyber security council. Members of the council 
include representatives of the Federal Chancellery as well as 
state secretaries from the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Ministry of Defence, the 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, the Federal 
Ministry of Justice, the Federal Ministry of Finance and the 
German Länder. Depending on the purpose of the meeting, 
also business representatives may be invited to participate. 
 In most cases, the 
47  “Bundeswehr bereit für Cyberangriffe”, Zeit Online, 5 June 
2012. 
48  For a more detailed discussion of the use of the multi-
stakeholder approach in the security sector (also in the frame-
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CERTs coordinate both public and private expertise 
and aim at involving all concerned parties in the 
process. Private firms that own and operate critical 
infrastructure (such as energy, transport, health etc.) 
are of particular significance, as the protection of 
their resources serves not only the stakeholders them-
selves but the society as a whole. Consequently, the 
state has a vested interest in ensuring that these com-
panies discharge their security responsibilities. 
International Level 
Effective legislation in the realm of cyber security 
needs to transcend the boundaries of the nation-state. 
The latter does maintain an important role by guar-
anteeing national security and protecting private 
property, but its possibilities to act in the borderless 
world of the Internet are extremely limited. It is thus 
of utmost importance that different national regu-
lations are harmonised at the international level. 
Cybercrimes can be committed from within a state 
where the relevant criminal law provisions or the 
legal basis for any form of prosecution are lacking 
(the problem of so called “safe-havens”). In many coun-
tries, breaking into foreign databases, for example, 
constitutes no offence as long as direct damage is not 
detectable. Given these complications, governments’ 
possibilities to act remain unclear: for instance, in 
the event of an attack on public infrastructure, who 
should the German prosecuting authorities pursue 
when the attack appears to have originated in a state 
that does not consider such as attack to constitute a 
criminal offence? 
The following overview lists important formal and 
informal governmental and non-governmental actors 
that deal with cyber security issues and operate at the 
international level. The overview makes clear how 
broad the range of the participating actors is and gives 
an account of their interests as well as of the strategies 
they use to protect private property and/or national 
security from cyber-attacks. A central role in the cyber 
security field has been played by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, but also organisations such as 
 
work of CERTs), see Andreas Schmidt, “At the Boundaries of 
Peer Production: The Organization of Internet Security Pro-
duction in the Cases of Estonia 2007 and Conficker”, Telecom-
munications Policy 36, no. 6 (July 2012): 451–61; Michel J. G. Van 
Eeten et al., “The Governance of Cybersecurity: A Framework 
for Policy”, International Journal of Critical Infrastructures 2, no. 4 
(2006): 357–78. 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 
the Group of 20 (G20), the Group of 8 (G8), NATO, the 
Shanghai group and Interpol have given impetus. In 
addition, there is a wide variety of transnational 
forums, regional organisations and non-governmental 
actors that are involved in cyber security issues. 
International Organisations 
The United Nations discusses cyber security issues 
extensively and has passed a number of resolutions on 
the subject. The Economic and Social Council adopted 
the resolutions 56/121 “Combating the Criminal Mis-
use of Information Technology” (2002) and 57/239 
“Creation of a Global Culture of Cybersecurity” (2003). 
Both aim first and foremost at combatting the afore-
mentioned safe-haven problem. The report 64/422 
“Globalization and Interdependence” (2009), on the 
other hand, invites all UN member states to review 
their respective national efforts to protect critical in-
formation infrastructures. A further central UN docu-
ment was adopted by the Disarmament Committee, 
whose resolution 64/386 “Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunication in the Context of 
International Security” (2009) led to the establishment 
of an expert group dealing with developments in the 
cyber security field. In its report, the group warned 
that states are increasingly developing cyber warfare 
capacities.49 Last but not least, the 2010 UN Report 
on Cyber Security launched a broad debate on the 
application of established principles of international 
law to cyberspace.50
At the operational level, the ITU has established 
itself as a major player in recent years,
 
51 mainly by 
organising events such as the Internet Governance 
Forum (IGF), the World Conference on International 
Telecommunications (WCIT) and the World Summit 
on the Information Society (WSIS).52
 
49  UN General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental 
Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommu-
nications in the Context of International Security, A/65/201 (30 July 
2010). 
 The WCIT is a 
purely intergovernmental conference and its main 
50  Jeffrey Carr, Inside Cyber Warfare. Mapping the Cyber Under-
world (Sebastopol, CA, 2010), Chapter 3. 
51  ITU, http://www.itu.int (accessed on 20 March 2012). 
52  ITU, World Conference on International Telecommunications 
(WCIT-12), http://www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/Pages/default.aspx 
(accessed on 20 March 2012). For an overview of the WSIS 
process, see Milton L. Mueller, Networks and States. The Global 
Politics of Internet Governance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010). 
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task is to review the so called International Telecom-
munications Regulations (ITR), a binding global treaty 
on telecommunications that was originally negotiated 
in 1988. 
The planned revision of the ITR is, however, a high-
ly controversial issue. This controversy is symptomatic 
of the persistent conflict within the international 
community over how to balance the demands of na-
tional security on the one hand and individual rights 
and liberties on the other. On the one side, there are 
the states that want to set up legally binding rules 
for almost all aspects of the Internet. In 2011, the so 
called Shanghai group (composed of China, Russia, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), for example, proposed 
that an intergovernmental Internet Code of Conduct 
should be drafted. This codex would set “norms and 
rules for the conduct of States in cyberspace”. The 
United Nations resolution of December 2011 endorses 
this proposal and requests the Secretary-General “to 
continue to study existing and potential threats in the 
sphere of information security and possible coopera-
tive measures to address them, including norms, rules 
or principles of responsible behaviour of States and 
confidence-building measures with regard to infor-
mation space”.53
UN support for the Shanghai group’s initiative has 
been met with little enthusiasm, particularly on the 
part of the US. The Shanghai Group’s approach runs 
contrary to the decentralised multi-stakeholder model 
favoured by the US. For the United States, interna-
tional treaties on cyber policy are too rigid, too state-
centric and too weak to effectively deter asymmetric 
cyber threats. In addition, the US is aware of its tech-
nological supremacy in all aspects concerning the 
Internet and, consequently, has only a limited interest 
in global Internet regulation. Instead, the US relies 
simply on an intensified dialogue on international 
norms of behaviour, confidence-building measures 
and strong involvement of private actors, as outlined 
in the “International Cyber Security Strategy” of the 
Obama Administration. 
 The underlying idea is that the sover-
eignty of states – threatened by the Internet – should 
be strengthened, and that any interference in the in-
ternal affairs of a state via the Internet should be for-
bidden. 
 
53  UN General Assembly, General Assembly, Gravely Concerned 
about Status of UN Disarmament Machinery, Especially in Conference 
on Disarmament, Invites States to Explore Options, GA/11182 (New 
York, 2 December 2011; cited by Kleinwächter, “Kalter Krieg 
im Cyberspace” [see note 9]). 
The US has, however, been more supportive of the 
Improvement Working Group that was founded in 
2010 in a bid to support the development of the Inter-
net Governance Forum (IGF). The IGF is founded on the 
multi-stakeholder approach, involving governments, 
private enterprises, technical experts and representa-
tives of civil society. Again, the opinion-forming pro-
cesses are, however, rather complicated. While some 
advocate binding decisions, others praise the virtues 
of free and non-binding discussions between different 
stakeholders. There is also no agreement on the future 
role of the IGF. Above all China and Russia are un-
willing to reinforce the IGF, as this would strengthen 
the role of non-state actors in cyber policy. 
The fundamentally different approach of the 
United States and Russia to the appropriate organisa-
tion of global cyber security policy is particularly 
apparent in the framework of the Organisation for 
Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE).54 While 
Russia favours the idea of a universal cyber convention 
that codifies reasonable standards of state behaviour, 
the US stresses the importance of national regula-
tions.55
In the meantime, also Interpol has become involved 
in Internet regulation.
 Germany has adopted a mediating role. At the 
computer expo CeBIT, chancellor Merkel expressed 
her support for formulating a codex that would guide 
government actions in cyberspace and should be 
signed by as many states as possible. At this point, it 
remains unclear as to which one of the international 
organisations (G8, G20, Council of Europe, the EU, 
NATO, OSCE or the UN) would be the most suitable 
point of contact for developing such a codex. However, 
as far as the operational level is concerned, the Ger-
man government considers the European Network 
and Information Security Agency (ENISA) to have a 
duty to take the matter further. 
56
 
54  See United States Mission to the OSCE, Cyber Security Key-
note Address by Dr. Deborah Schneider, U.S. Department of State, 
FSC-PC.DEL/30/10 (9 June 2010), http://www.osce.org/fsc/68524 
(accessed on 23 February 2012). 
 The organisation plans to set 
55  Cf. Franz-Stefan Gady and Greg Austin, Russia, the United 
States, and Cyber Diplomacy. Opening the Doors (New York: 
EastWest Institute, 2010); Statement by Mr. S. Shestakov, Repre-
sentative of the Russian Federation, at the Joint Meeting of the OSCE 
Forum for Security Co-operation and the OSCE Permanent Council, 
FSC-PC.DEL/31/10 (10 June 2010), http://www.osce.org/fsc/ 
68693 (accessed on 23 March 2012). 
56  For a good overview of the different legal frameworks 
applied in the fight against cyber criminality, see Marco 
Gercke, Understanding Cybercrime: a Guide for Developing Coun-
tries, 2. edition (Geneva: ITU, March 2011); see also ITU 
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up a central research and investigation unit to combat 
cybercrime.57
Another international forum that has been able to 
agree on common cyber security measures is the G8. 
The organisation’s actions include the establishment 
of a joint working group on cybercrime (the so called 
Lyon-Rome Group) as well as the development of an 
emergency communications and support network. 
The latter should enable effective communication in 
cases where there is electronic evidence of a cyber 
offence and an urgent need for cooperation between 
law enforcement authorities from different states. 
 Planned to be based in Singapore and 
scheduled to become operational in 2014, the so called 
Interpol Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI) will 
have research, development and training facilities as 
well as advanced computer forensic laboratories. The 
IGCI’s work will mainly focus on evaluating and devel-
oping open source software for law enforcement 
authorities. In addition, the centre will provide assis-
tance to states currently without sufficient cyber-
crime-fighting capabilities. 
Regional International Organisations 
Due to fundamental differences of opinion on regu-
latory issues between participating states, global inter-
national organisations have been hampered by con-
flict and unable to achieve much progress in cyber 
policy. The achievements of regional international 
organisations thus exceed those of the UN by far. The 
Council of Europe’s 2001 Convention on Cybercrime 
stands as probably the most important regional agree-
ment in the field of cyber security to date. Ratified in 
2004, the convention provides common definitions of 
the various types of cybercrime and forms the basis for 
closer judicial cooperation between member states 
of the Council and several non-European countries, 
notably the United States and Canada. Many countries 
have also ratified an Additional Protocol to the Con-
vention on Cybercrime concerning the criminalisation 
of racist or xenophobic acts.58
 
Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA) – High Level Experts 
Group (HLEG), Global Strategic Report (Geneva: ITU, 2008). 
 In addition, both the 
57  Interpol, The INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation, 
http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/The-INTERPOL-
Global-Complex-for-Innovation (accessed on February 23, 
2012). 
58  Council of Europe, Cybercrime, http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/ 
cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/default_en.asp 
(accessed on 20 March 2012). 
Council of Europe and the OECD have developed their 
own principles for a safer Internet.59
In recent years, also NATO has worked to develop 
an effective cyber security policy.
 Both organisa-
tions emphasise the universality and integrity of a safe 
and secure Internet and support the involvement of 
private actors in the formulation of new rules. They 
also stress the importance of maintaining the existing 
architecture of the Internet with open standards and 
decentralised management. Importantly, the Council 
of Europe is also considering whether to invite private 
actors to take part in the intergovernmental negotia-
tion process. 
60 In its new strategic 
concept, NATO not only sets itself the goal of improv-
ing its military capabilities to avert cyber-attacks, but 
also promises to provide its member states with volun-
tary security standards for the protection of critical 
infrastructure.61
The capacity of the Council of Europe and NATO to 
agree on common definitions and measures results 
from the fact that the member states of both organisa-
tions have cooperated closely for years. It goes to show 
that in order to adopt binding international rules to 
 In June 2011, NATO published its 
Cyber Defence Policy that emphasises the importance 
of cyber security and institutionalises a formal struc-
ture for policy coordination. The newly established 
NATO Cyber Defence Management Authority (CDMA) 
has been assigned the responsibility for coordination 
and strategic decisions on cyber security issues, where-
as the Emerging Security Challenges Division coordi-
nates the political and strategic overview of NATO’s 
cyber defence measures. Operational responsibilities 
fall to the Computer Incident Response Capability – 
Technical Centre (NCIRC TC), whereas the so called 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD 
COE) acts as an interface between the alliance on the 
one hand and the scientific community and the gen-
eral public on the other. 
 
59  Cf. OECD, Communiqué on Principles for Internet Policy Making, 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/21/48289796.pdf, and Council 
of Europe, Internet Governance Principles, http://www.coe.int/t/ 
dghl/standardsetting/media-dataprotection/conf-internet-
freedom/Internet%20Governance%20Principles.pdf (accessed 
on 21 January 2012). 
60  Nato, NATO and Cyber Defence, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
SID-E1098959-0D8780E1/natolive/topics_78170.htm? 
(accessed on 20 March 2012). 
61  Cf. Nato, Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept 
for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation, November 19, 2010, http://www.nato.int/ 
cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm (accessed on 20 March 
2012). 
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regulate the Internet, it is necessary that the negotiat-
ing states trust each other and have similar views on 
the right balance between individual liberties, market 
economy and public authority. Within Europe and 
between Europe and the United States this is largely 
the case. By contrast, the relationship of the states 
from both sides of the Atlantic with states such as 
China and Russia is dominated by mistrust and mu-
tual accusations. Against this background, it seems 
unlikely that the international community would 
be able to establish truly global rules concerning the 
Internet or contribute to an effective global cyber 
defence. Currently, a more probable scenario is the 
creation of two parallel cyberspaces with distinct 
regulatory standards. This development would greatly 
affect both freedom and security on the Internet. 
Transnational Forums 
 The US and other Western states base their cyber 
strategies largely on the positive experiences they 
have had in recent years with transnational forums 
that allow also private actors to participate.62
The multi-stakeholder approach, favoured by the 
US and most Western states, not only brings together 
organisations and forums from the national, inter-
national, regional and transnational level, but also 
supports the idea that private actors themselves 
assume the responsibility for coordinating their ex-
pertise. Important private actors in the cyber security 
 The 
Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams 
(FIRST) stands as a good example of the benefits of 
the multi-stakeholder approach. At FIRST conferences, 
governmental and non-governmental IT security 
experts exchange information and experiences con-
cerning attacks and malware, while simultaneously 
building personal relationships and mutual trust. 
FIRST also accredits domestic and non-governmental 
CERTs, offering them valuable expertise. Currently, 
FIRST and the ITU are trying to coordinate their 
activities in order to ensure that private and public 
expert knowledge are combined in the most effective 
manner. Ideally, this could lead to a new form of 
public-private partnership that would unite political 
authority and private knowledge, thus paving the way 
for innovative transnational solutions. 
 
62  For basic information on the participation of private 
actors, see PPPs in der Sicherheitspolitik: Chancen und Grenzen, CSS 
Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik, 111 (Zurich: CSS, April 2012). 
field include the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics En-
gineers (IEEE), the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN), the International Cyber 
Security Protection Alliance (ICSPA) and the Financial 
Services – Information Sharing and Analysis Centre 
(FS-ISAC). All of these privately operated organisa-
tions contribute to coordinating protection measures 
against cyber-attacks, develop appropriate instru-
ments for the private sector and provide expertise and 
support to governmental and intergovernmental insti-
tutions. The existence of these private organisations 
reflects the widespread perception in Europe and the 
US that governmental institutions alone cannot be ex-
pected to identify critical cyber challenges or to devel-
op appropriate, timely responses. This view forms the 
basis for Western regulatory liberalism in questions 
concerning the Internet and clearly differentiates it 
from the state-centric regulatory approach favoured 
by Russia and China. 
The oldest non-governmental platform in the field 
of technical development of the Internet is the IETF.63 
It was formed in 1986 and brings together many of the 
most influential software programmers in the history 
of the Internet. The IETF has neither a clearly defined 
membership nor a strict hierarchical structure, reject-
ing “kings, presidents and voting” and relying on 
“rough consensus and running codes”.64
A similar, non-hierarchical method has guided the 
formulation of the so called RFCs (Request for Com-
ment). The RFCs are memorandums on internet-
related issues and have been published since the late 
1960s. They are regularly adopted by the IETF as inter-
net standards. For example, the work of the regional 
internet registries (RIR), the regional organisations 
that manage the allocation of IP addresses, is not regu-
lated by an international treaty but by RFCs adopted 
and published by the IETF.
 
65
When it comes to the development of standards 
and the allocation of IP addresses, a particularly im-
portant role is played by ICANN. ICANN is a non-profit 
 Another important pri-
vate non-profit institution is the IEEE that boasts more 
than 350,000 members and deals primarily with issues 
of connectivity between different devices and the har-
monisation of technical standards. 
 
63  The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), http://www. 
ietf.org (accessed on March 22, 2012). 
64  The Tao of IETF, sub-point 3, http://www.ietf.org/tao.html# 
anchor3 (accessed on 22 March 2012). 
65  Cf. Kleinwächter, “Wie reguliert man den Cyberspace?” 
(see note 8). 
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public-benefit corporation that operates under the 
laws of the State of California.66 Contractually, ICANN 
is a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization 
(QANGO) and cooperates closely with the US Depart-
ment of Commerce.67
A further non-profit association of private enter-
prises is the ICSPA that was founded in 2011.
 Consequently, the US Govern-
ment enjoys significantly more influence within the 
organization than other participating governments. 
The privileged position of the US within ICANN draws 
widespread criticism from the international commu-
nity. In 2011, India, Brazil and South Africa (the so 
called IBSA countries) thus called for the creation of a 
Committee for Internet-Related Policies, a new inter-
governmental UN body that would supervise ICANN 
and other similar organisations and also act as an 
international court of justice for Internet-related 
matters. 
68 What 
makes the ICSPA especially interesting is the fact that 
it provides national law enforcement agencies with 
expertise and even material resources, thus touching 
upon a core area of state sovereignty.69
Last years have also witnessed the establishment of 
several sector-specific cooperation forums in the cyber 
security field. The FS-ISAC was launched in the late 
1990s in response to an order by the US President 
demanding more cooperation between the public and 
private sectors to help protect critical infrastructure.
 The founding 
members of the organisation include IT security spe-
cialists such as Trend Micro and McAfee, the financial 
services corporation Visa Europe and the major British 
online retailer Shop Direct. In addition, the organisa-
tion cooperates closely with the European Police 
Office. 
70
 
66  Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers. A California Nonprofit Public-Benefit Corporation, 
www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm (accessed on 15 
January 2012). 
 
The main function of the FS-ISAC is to gather infor-
mation from the financial industry, security compa-
nies, federal and state government agencies, law en-
67  See ICANN, http://www.icann.org (accessed on 15 January 
2012). 
68  See ICSPA, https://www.icspa.org (accessed on 15 January 
2012). 
69  “Cybercrime-Allianz ICSPA sagt Web-Kriminellen den 
Kampf an”, TecChannel, 6 July 2011, http://www.tecchannel.de/ 
sicherheit/news/2036365/cybercrime_allianz_sagt_web_ 
gangstern_den_kampf_an (accessed on 15 January 2012). 
70  Further details can be found on the web page of FS-ISAC, 
http://www.fsisac.com (accessed on 15 January 2012). 
forcement authorities as well as other interested 
governmental and non-governmental actors in order 
to contribute to the development of effective defence 
measures against cyber-attacks. 
This overview of governance structures in the cyber 
policy field shows that the role of democratic gover-
nance in global cyber security politics is limited to the 
application of the delegation principle. Parliaments 
still struggle to find their place in this policy area. 
Even in the framework of the European Union it is 
evident that developments such as the blurring of 
boundaries between different policy areas, the secu-
ritisation and the privatisation of security all chal-
lenge the traditional separation of powers and, thus, 
the core of democratic governance. 
 
 
Cyber Security Policy in the European Union 
SWP Berlin 
European Cyber Security Policy 
October 2012 
 
 
 
19 
Cyber Security Policy in the European Union 
 
The nascent institutional structure of global Internet 
regulation is very important in view of the EU’s own 
regulation efforts. The Union and its member states 
take part in almost all of the above-mentioned insti-
tutions and use these as platforms to cooperate with 
one another as well as with other states. However, 
the Union is not only another actor within the global 
institutional landscape, but also constitutes a highly 
developed institutional structure of its own. As an 
institutional framework for formulating cross-border 
policies, the EU is something of a model for what takes 
place on a global scale: developments that we witness 
in the EU today can be seen as a precursor of devel-
opments at the international level. The internal 
dynamics of the EU can thus give interesting insight 
into the future perspectives of global Internet regu-
lation. In fact, the dynamics of global cyber security 
policy are often identical to those in the EU.71
Cyber security is now high on the political agenda 
of the EU.
 
72
 
71  One example is the European Commission’s proposal for a 
strategy on the protection of children on the Internet. Hama-
doun Touré, the secretary-general of the ITU, picked up the 
idea and called for the introduction of an international code 
for protecting children online, praising it as a small step 
towards the establishment an “International Code of Conduct 
for Information Security”. “New Strategy to Make Internet 
Safer for Children”, Bulletin Quotidien Europe, no. 10606 (3 May 
2012): 7; Monika Ermert, “ITU will globales Abkommen für 
Cybersecurity vorantreiben”, Heise Online, 17 May 2012. 
 The EU Commissioners Cecilia Malmström 
and Neelie Kroes as well as the High Representative 
Catherine Ashton are currently working on an EU 
strategy on cyber security. At a transatlantic forum 
72  The presidency trio formed by Spain, Belgium and Hun-
gary, for example, explicitly dealt with cyber security issues 
in the so called M.A.D.R.I.D. report, published in May 2010. 
Council of the European Union, First Main Assessment and 
Description Report for Internal Debate, M.A.D.R.I.D. Report (Brus-
sels, 26 May 2010), http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/ 
en/10/st10/st10203.en10.pdf (accessed on 20 January 2012). 
After the report was published, EU Counter-terrorism Co-
ordinator Gilles de Kerchove announced that he was going 
to develop “a comprehensive approach to address cyberterror-
ism, cybercrime, cyberattacks/-war and cybersecurity”. Coun-
cil of the European Union, Note from EU Counter-Terrorism Co-
ordinator to Council/European Council, Subject: EU Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy, Discussion Paper, 9685/10 (Brussels, 10 May 2010). 
in Washington in the beginning of May, Malmström 
gave a short overview of the core areas covered by the 
strategy that remains, according to her, a “work in 
progress”. As a cross-cutting theme of the strategy, 
Malmström mentioned finding the right balance 
between freedom and security in cyber space. Other, 
more specific aims of the strategy include enhancing 
the EU’s resilience and response capability, building 
public-private partnerships and advancing interna-
tional cooperation on cyber security issues, especially 
with strategic partners.73
Already in March 2010, the European Commission 
proposed an action plan for the implementation of 
a concerted strategy to combat cybercrime.
 
74 In its 
proposal, the Commission stated that cybercrime “is 
borderless by nature” and that the fight against cyber 
threats requires “effective, adequate cross-border pro-
visions”. These measures should include enhanced 
mutual assistance in law enforcement operations.75 
According to the Commission, “the objective of build-
ing a coherent and cooperative approach within the 
EU remains as important as ever”, but “it needs to be 
embedded into a global coordination strategy reach-
ing out to key partners, be they individual nations or 
relevant international organisations”.76
 
73  Cecilia Malmström, The European Response to the Rising 
Cyber Threat, Transatlantic Cyber Conference Organised by the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, the European 
Security Roundtable and SRA International, Speech/12/315 
(Washington, D.C., 2 May 2012). 
 Therefore, the 
EU and its institutions have established contacts with 
almost all international organisations and also allow 
these to participate in the European legislative process 
74  Council of the European Union, Draft Council Conclusions on 
an Action Plan to Implement the Concerted Strategy to Combat Cyber-
crime (Brussels, 25 March 2010), http://register.consilium. 
europa.eu/pdf/de/10/st05/st05957-re02.de10.pdf> (accessed 
on 15 January 2012). 
75  An example is the so called TransAtlantic IPR Portal that 
was launched at the meeting of the Transatlantic Economic 
Council in December 2010. This portal seeks “to encourage 
small business (SMEs) to break into foreign markets and avoid 
risks in terms of the violation of their intellectual property 
rights (IPR)”. See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/initiatives/ipr/ 
index_en.htm (accessed on 25 March 2012). 
76  Communication from the Commission on Critical Information 
Infrastructure Protection (see note 14). 
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as far as this is possible and appears advisable. Con-
sequently, the EU’s approach could best be described 
as a multi-stakeholder approach coupled with inten-
sified regional cooperation and a strong international 
dimension. 
Joint cyber security exercises serve as a good exam-
ple of the international dimension of the EU’s cyber 
security policy. Exercises involving EU member states 
and the United States now take place regularly. 
Already in 2010, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
participated in “Cyber Storm”, a civil-military cyber 
exercise sponsored by the US Department of Home-
land Security. Also Australia, Canada, Japan and New 
Zealand as well as 60 private enterprises took part in 
the exercise. In November 2010, the so called High-
Level EU-US Working Group on Cybersecurity and 
Cybercrime77 was established and tasked with drafting 
“a cooperation programme culminating in a joint EU-
US cyber-incident exercise by the end of 2011”.78
The Blurring of Boundaries between Internal 
and External Policy 
 In the 
framework of the ensuing Cyber Atlantic exercise in 
2011, experts from more than 20 countries simulated 
cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure such as power 
plants in order to test how cyber security cooperation 
between different states works. 
In a globalised world, it is no longer possible to clear-
ly distinguish between an internal and an external 
space. This trend is evident also in the context of the 
EU: the formerly sharp distinction between internal 
and external policies is eroding, especially in the field 
of cyber security. European cyber security policy is 
largely the result of a close cooperation between insti-
tutions responsible for home and justice affairs policy 
as well as institutions responsible for foreign policy. 
This cooperation finds expression in the joint meet-
ings of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and 
the Committee on Operational Cooperation on Inter-
nal Security (COSI) as well as in the joint sessions of 
the Parliamentary Committee on Civil Liberties, Jus-
 
77  EU-U.S. Summit 20 November 2010, Lisbon – Joint Statement, 
MEMO/10/597 (Brussels, 20 November 2010). 
78  Cyber Security: EU and US Strengthen Transatlantic Cooperation 
in Face of Mounting Global Cyber-security and Cyber-crime Threats, 
MEMO/11/246 (Brussels, 14 April 2011). 
tice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs (AFET).79
The meetings of these bodies have shown that it 
is very difficult to distinguish between internal and 
external security. For example, the protection of 
critical infrastructure (including energy, health, trans-
port and communications) against cyber threats 
requires measures of both foreign policy and home 
and justice affairs policy. 
 
The Commission’s Communication on Critical 
Information Infrastructure Protection from March 
201180 warns about the threat posed by cyber terror-
ism and cyber war and calls for more effective internal 
defence measures against these external threats. The 
Council document 10299/11, on the other hand, urges 
the member states to promote a new culture of risk 
analysis and management. The development of “co-
ordinated actions to prevent, detect, mitigate and 
react to all kinds of disruptions”81 should be under-
stood as a central challenge at the national, European 
and international level. In order to effectively respond 
to attacks from third states, the Council suggests that 
the European Network and Information Security 
Agency (ENISA) should be modernised and reinforced. 
In addition, coordination between the National Com-
puter Emergency Response Teams (CERT) should be 
enhanced.82 The need to create new CERTs and im-
prove the existing ones is emphasised also in the 
European Commission’s communication “The EU 
Internal Security Strategy in Action”.83
 
79  See Cecilia Malmström, The EU Internal Security Strategy – 
What Does It Mean for the United States? Discussion Organised 
by the Center for Transatlantic Relations, Speech/10/739, 
(Washington, D.C., 8 December 2010). 
 Other 
important steps listed by the Commission include the 
setting up of a European Information Sharing and 
Alert System (EISAS) to detect attacks on critical 
infrastructure, the development of national contin-
gency plans in cooperation with ENISA and the 
organisation of regular emergency exercises. 
80  Communication from the Commission on Critical Information 
Infrastructure Protection (see note 14). 
81  Council of the European Union, Critical Information 
Infrastructure Protection “Achievements and Next Steps: Towards 
Global Cyber Security” (CIIP) – Adoption of Council Conclusions, 
10299/11 (Brussels, 19 May 2011), 2. 
82  European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA), http://www.enisa.europa.eu/media/. 
83  Cf. also Council of the European Union, Draft Council Con-
clusions on the Development of the External Dimension of the Euro-
pean Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, 10662/11 
(Brussels, 27 May 2011). 
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Cyber Europe 201084 made it clear that the EU’s 
capacity to react to cyber threats is compromised by 
the unclear distribution of competences within the 
Union as well as the lack of effective internal struc-
tures in the smaller member states.85
Securitisation 
 This shows that 
internal problems can rapidly turn into external 
vulnerabilities. In other words, domestic politics are 
highly relevant to security policy. Insufficient domes-
tic regulation has an immediate negative effect on the 
security of other states. 
A further trend that is visible in the EU is the securiti-
sation of the agenda of the home and justice affairs 
policy. The Union’s stated aim is to create an “area of 
freedom, security and justice”. In recent years, the 
Commission and the member states have, however, 
focused almost exclusively on the security dimension, 
underlining the importance of responding to emerg-
ing threats by introducing ever new security mea-
sures.86 The European Council’s Stockholm Pro-
gramme, for example, called for the formulation of 
“a comprehensive Union internal security strategy”,87
 
84  Cf. Deutscher Bundestag, Antwort der Bundesregierung 
auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Andrej Hunko u.a.: Cyber-
Übungen der Europäischen Union, der USA und die deutsche Betei-
ligung, Drucksache 17/7578 (2 November 2011). 
 
a document that pays only limited attention to data 
protection concerns. Unsurprisingly, the Commis-
sion’s response to the Stockholm Programme is also 
written in a similar vein. Instead of proposing mea-
sures to protect and promote civil liberties and 
individual rights, the communication mostly talks 
about security issues such as organized criminality, 
cyber criminality, terrorism, border protection and 
85  Communication from the Commission on Critical Information 
Infrastructure Protection (see note 14). 
86  Cf. Madalina Busuioc and Deirdre Curtin, The EU Internal 
Security Strategy, The EU Policy Cycle and The Role of (AFSJ) Agencies: 
Promise, Perils and Pre-requisites, a study requested by the Euro-
pean Parliament, PE453.185 (Brussels, 2011); Communication 
from the Commission: A Strategy on the External Dimension of the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, COM(2005) 491 final (Brus-
sels, 12 October 2005); Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Kristian Søby 
Kristensen, “Introduction”, in Securing “the Homeland”. Critical 
Infrastructure, Risk, and (In)Security, ed. Myriam Dunn Cavelty 
and Kristian Søby Kristensen (London: Routledge, 2008). 
87  “The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure 
Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens”, Official Journal of 
the European Union, C 115 (4 May 2010): 1, 17. 
disaster response.88
In current political discourse, security thus appears 
to trump freedom, a development echoed by the Euro-
pean Data Protection Supervisor’s recent criticism that 
“some of the actions that derive from the ISS objec-
tives may increase the risks for individuals’ privacy 
and data protection”.
 Although the Commission notes 
in its communication that the EU’s cyber security 
policy must be “based on common values including 
the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights”, 
this statement has little substantial effect on the 
actions the Commission proposes. The Commission 
elaborates on the diverse security challenges facing 
the EU, the Union’s security policy goals as well as the 
security measures that need to be taken. At the same 
time, the communication neglects to propose 
measures for the protection of the fundamental 
informational rights of EU citizens against invasive 
government policies. None of the actions listed in the 
annex of the Commission’s strategy addresses this 
issue. 
89
It is also striking that administrative actors have 
a more and more central role in European security 
policy. In matters concerning the implementation of 
the EU Internal Security Strategy, EU agencies will 
have the same rights as the EP, the Commission, the 
Council and the member states.
 
90 The most impor-
tant agencies in the field of cyber security are ENISA, 
Europol, the European Police College (CEPOL), the Eu-
ropean Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the Euro-
pean External Action Service (EEAS). At the end of 
March 2012, the European Commission proposed 
the establishment of a further agency, the European 
Cybercrime Centre.91
 
88  Cf. Communication from the Commission to the European Par-
liament and the Council: The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: 
Five Steps towards a More Secure Europe, COM(2010) 673 final 
(Brussels, 22 November 2010). 
 According to the Commission’s 
proposal, the centre should become part of Europol 
and act as the focal point of the EU’s fight against 
89  “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council – ‘EU Internal Security Strategy 
in Action: Five Steps towards a More Secure Europe’”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, C 101 (1 April 2011): 6, 9. 
90  For more information, see Deirdre Curtin, Executive Power 
of the European Union. Law, Practices, and the Living Constitution 
(New York, 2009). 
91  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament, Tackling Crime in Our Digital Age: Establishing a 
European Cybercrime Centre, COM(2012) 140 final (Brussels, 
28 March 2012). 
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cybercrime. The centre’s main tasks would be to help 
member states and EU organs to develop their oper-
ational and analytical capacities for conducting 
cybercrime investigations and to enhance interna-
tional cooperation. In addition, the Commission 
encourages the member states to set up centres of 
excellence. These centres should be built up in close 
cooperation with Europol, the European Police 
College and Eurojust, and cooperate closely with 
universities and the IT industry.92
The European Parliament, on the other hand, is 
visibly marginalised:
 
93 “Incredible as it may appear, 
the principle strategic documents adopted to date by 
the European Council, the Council and the Commis-
sion seem to ignore the existence of the European 
Parliament altogether. While such a thing would, to 
say the least, have been surprising prior to the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it is nothing less than 
inexplicable one year afterwards.”94
The above-described shift in EU legislation is appar-
ent also in the limited range of the Union’s data pro-
tection policies. The EU’s lack of interest to deal with 
issues concerning individual freedoms means that the 
Union’s data protection rules remain “a patchwork”.
 
95 
And when the EU does enact legislation, its actions 
tend to compromise basic individual rights rather 
than to strengthen them. Directive 2006/24 on data 
retention is a typical example.96
 
92  Cf. The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action (see note 
 It obliges all EU mem-
ber states to record the telephone calls of their citi-
zens in order to support criminal investigations. The 
idea is to be able to trace all phone calls and mobile 
phone calls made as well as all emails sent during the 
last six to 24 months. In addition, service providers 
have to retain the location data of calls made or mes-
88). 
93  For a lengthier discussion of this topic, see Aidan Wills 
and Mathias Vermeulen, Parliamentary Oversight of Security and 
Intelligence Agencies in the European Union, a study requested 
by the European Parliament, PE453.207 (Brussels, 2011). 
94  European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs, Working Document on the European 
Union’s Internal security Strategy, Rapporteur: Rita Borsellino, 
PE458.598v01-00 (Brussel, 2011), 4. 
95  Franziska Boehm, Information Sharing and Data Protection in 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Towards Harmonised Data 
Protection Principles for EU-Internal Information Exchange, disserta-
tion (Luxembourg, 2011). 
96  “Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated 
or processed in connection with the provision of available 
electronic communications services or of public communica-
tions networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L 105 (13 April 2006). 
sages sent from a mobile phone or a smart phone. The 
retention of IP addresses, on the other hand, should – 
together with other available data – allow investiga-
tors to identify Internet users. The data retention 
directive considerably limits the citizens’ right to 
informational self-determination. Originally, it was 
meant to be transposed into national law by Septem-
ber 15, 2007. Accordingly, Germany delivered a list of 
agreed transposition measures to the European Com-
mission in 2008. However, the implementation pro-
cess was stopped by the Federal Constitutional Court 
in 2010. According to the Court, the laws to imple-
ment the directive infringed the fundamental right 
to secrecy of telecommunications. This difference of 
opinion could well lead to a conflict between the Com-
mission and the Federal Constitutional Court in the 
future. 
Privatisation of Governance 
At the international level, private actors participate 
more and more actively in cyber security policy. The 
same trend is evident also in European cyber security 
policy. Udo Helmbrecht, the director of ENISA, recent-
ly called for a stronger involvement of private actors 
in the agency’s operations, including security exer-
cises, public-private partnerships for network resil-
ience, economic analysis and risk assessment, as well 
as campaigns to inform medium-sized businesses and 
the general public about cyber threats: “All security 
actors will […] have to be working more closely to-
gether and develop better and more coordinated strat-
egies”.97
The EU also seeks closer cooperation with Internet 
service providers and non-governmental organisations 
 ENISA has also drafted a detailed guide to 
establishing public-private partnerships, the so called 
European Public-Private Partnership for Resilience 
(EP3R). It is based on mutual interest: the EU and 
member state governments want to profit from the 
expertise of private actors, whereas these turn to the 
Union in hope for more effective legislation and better 
protection from cyber espionage and cyber-attacks. 
 
97  Cf. ENISA, EU Agency Analysis of “Stuxnet” Malware: A Para-
digm Shift in Threats and Critical Information Infrastructure Pro-
tection, Press release (7 October 2010), http://www.enisa. 
europa.eu/media/press-releases/eu-agency-analysis-of-2018 
stuxnet2019-malware-a-paradigm-shift-in-threats-and-critical-
information-infrastructure-protection-1 (quoted in Matthias 
Monroy, “EU fürchtet Angriffe auf Informationssysteme”, 
Heise Online – Telepolis, 11 October 2010). 
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in order to combat illegal online content, such mes-
sages endorsing terrorist activities. The Union plans to 
establish common guidelines for reporting and delet-
ing such content. The EU’s own internet platform Con-
tact Initiative against Cybercrime for Industry and Law 
Enforcement (CICILE) should serve as a communica-
tion channel for relevant stakeholders.98
The European Parliament also considers private 
actors to be of central importance. The members of 
the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs of the EP recently urged Internet service pro-
viders to put more effort into protecting their IT 
systems. The committee also threatened to sanction 
companies that fail to meet the required minimum 
standards. In addition, the MEPs proposed tougher 
penalties for attacks on IT systems and demanded that 
offenders have to be consequently punished through-
out the EU. Last but not least, the committee wants to 
oblige companies to both take preventive measures 
and cooperate with the police in criminal investiga-
tions. All in all, both the cooperation between differ-
ent authorities and the cooperation between the pub-
lic and the private sector in cyber security issues is to 
be enhanced.
 Europol has 
also intensified its cooperation with private actors, 
such as ICPSA. 
99
 
 
 
 
98  See Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions 
Concerning an Action Plan to Implement the Concerted Strategy to 
Combat Cybercrime, 15569/08 (Brussels, 26 April 2010); Council 
of the European Union, Draft Council Conclusions on an Action 
Plan to Implement the Concerted Strategy to Combat Cybercrime, 
5957/2/10 (Brussels, 25 March 2010), http://www.statewatch.org/ 
news/2010/mar/eu-council-revised-cyber-crime-conlcusions-
5957-rev2-10.pdf (accessed on 22 March 2012). 
99  Monika Hohlmeier, EU-Strafrecht: Cyber-Angriffe sind kein 
Kavaliersdelikt/Konsequente Strafen gegen Hacker-Attacken/Unter-
nehmen müssen ihre IT-Systeme besser schützen/EP-Innenausschuss zu 
neuer EU-Richtlinie, Press release, 27 March 2012, http://www. 
monika-hohlmeier.de/eu-strafrecht-cyber-angriffe-sind-kein-
kavaliersdelikt-konsequente-strafen-gegen-hacker-attacken-
unternehmen-muessen-ihre-it-systeme-besser-schuetzen-ep-
innenausschuss-zu-neuer-eu-richtlinie/ (accessed on 8 April 
2012); see also Council of the European Union, Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Attacks 
against Information Systems, Replacing Council Framework Decision 
2005/222/JHA, 10751/11 (Brussels, 30 May 2011). 
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Taken together, the afore-presented developments 
suggest that the institutional structure of cyber secu-
rity policy considerably deviates from the standards of 
democratic governance. Cyber security policy is being 
formulated at various political levels (national, Euro-
pean, international), is to a significant extent driven 
by private actors and defies any clear categorisation 
into internal or external policy. All three levels of 
cyber security policy are closely intertwined, forming 
a complex network-like structure (see the section 
“Summary” below). From the point of view of demo-
cratic governance, this multi-level structure is a source 
of several problems. These problems should be taken 
into account when proposals for new rules and regu-
lations in this policy area are being formulated (see 
the section “Recommendations”). 
Summary 
The institutional structure guiding global Internet 
regulation emerged spontaneously rather than as a 
result of constitutional considerations or a carefully 
crafted plan. This spontaneity is likely to remain a 
characteristic feature of global Internet politics also in 
the future. The political framework of global internet 
regulation builds on cooperation, coordination and 
co-optation, and no stakeholder alone is strong 
enough to change its operational logic. Neither the 
United States nor the EU (or any other international 
organisation) is in a position to unilaterally shape 
global cyber security policy. 
European cyber security policy is formulated within 
a multi-level, multi-stakeholder structure. Within this 
political framework, consensus-building across differ-
ent sectors and private expertise are of particular 
importance. For the first time, experts from private 
companies and organizations thus have the chance 
to take part in shaping security policy. In the past, 
private actors have only been involved in less sensitive 
policy areas, such as economic policy, environmental 
policy and utility policy. Although increasing private 
sector participation involves obvious risks, it can also 
be optimistically seen as a first step on the road 
towards a more democratic security policy. 
EU agencies and transnational non-governmental 
organisations are the principal channels through 
which private actors can be integrated into the politi-
cal process whenever their expertise is needed. In such 
cases, private actors are likely to be able to use their 
comparative technological advantage to decisively 
influence the political agenda of the EU. Private actors 
also profit from the fact that neither the Commission 
nor the Council has enough agenda-setting power or 
the capacity to shape the decision-making process as a 
whole. Instead, expertise and authority in this policy 
area are dispersed across different actors and layers, 
and coordination across various stakeholders is at 
least as important as building majorities. With the 
exception of cases in which the co-decision procedure 
applies, the European Parliament has only a very 
limited role in cyber security policy. 
For the most part, decision-making in the cyber 
policy field is characterised by a lack of transparency 
and accountability. Actors with no special expertise or 
political authority are excluded from decision-making 
at national, European and international level. Nation-
al parliaments, for example, only play a subordinated 
role at all three levels, being almost completely absent 
from the European level and hardly participating in 
the development of national cyber defence measures. 
Considering the importance of parliaments for demo-
cratic governance, this state of affairs constitutes a 
serious problem. At least at the national and European 
level, serious efforts are thus needed to provide nation-
al parliaments with the necessary means to both fol-
low the development of European cyber security 
policy and to deliver well-founded opinions on cyber 
security issues. At the moment, both the Bundestag 
and the European Parliament lack the scientific 
expertise and resources to perform these functions. 
Recommendations 
How should the new European cyber security archi-
tecture be evaluated? And how is it possible to mea-
sure its democratic credentials? According to the 
European Commission’s White Paper on European 
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governance,100
In the current political discourse, it is possible to 
identify at least five concrete proposals for improving 
security in cyber space. These five proposals can be 
evaluated on the basis of the criteria discussed above. 
 democratic decision-making processes 
should be characterised by openness, rule of law, 
accountability and participation. In this vein, public-
private partnerships are welcome additions to the 
legislative process if they combine social expertise and 
government authority in a meaningful way. Further-
more, it is important that so called diffuse interests 
(i.e. interest groups that are organised only loosely or 
not at all) as well as concerns related to the right of 
informational self-determination are taken into con-
sideration in the process. Wider public participation 
should also be possible – Internet regulation is, after 
all, an issue that touches upon various aspects of 
political and economic life as well as upon the private 
sphere of citizens. The pervasiveness of the Internet 
and the ensuing consequences of Internet regulation 
for society as a whole should be more intensively 
discussed above all in the cyber security field. 
Raising awareness of cyber threats:  Almost all institu-
tions and individuals dealing with questions of Inter-
net security stress that it is indispensable to raise 
public and political awareness of the threats posed by 
cyber criminality and cyber terrorism. This requires a 
high degree of transparency concerning the different 
cyber threats. Representatives of law enforcement 
agencies must receive adequate training and be prop-
erly equipped in order to arrest and prosecute Internet 
criminals and terrorists. The Bundestag and various 
national ministries have already established commit-
tees in order to meet these challenges. Also national 
security services have taken important measures. How-
ever, as far as the above-mentioned transparency 
dimension is concerned, there is still plenty of room 
for improvement. A notable shortcoming is the lack of 
information exchange between the parliament and 
the government as well as between private companies 
and government security authorities concerning the 
quantity and quality of cyber-attacks. 
Collecting more information on cyber threats:  The EU 
and the US have both recently launched widely-
debated initiatives to oblige private companies to 
report cyber-attacks to the national security authori-
ties. The US Government defends the initiative as a 
necessary measure to guarantee national security. 
 
100  Cf. European Commission, European Governance: A White 
Paper, COM(2001) 428 final (Brussels, 25 July 2001). 
However, to its opponents the plan represents a 
violation of the right to informational self-determi-
nation, i.e. the right of each company to decide in-
dependently when it wants to release data and whom 
it wants to provide access to that data. As such, the 
debate underlines the difficulty of finding the right 
balance between such central values as security and 
freedom and shows, once again, how important it 
is to discuss issues of Internet regulation in an open, 
participatory process that involves parliamentary 
representation. 
Enhancing prosecution of cybercrime cases:  At some 
point, all discussions on cyber security issues tend to 
mention deterrence and debate the possibility of 
imposing tougher penalties for cyber offences. It is 
undisputed that a cyber-attack on critical infrastruc-
ture poses a serious threat to national security and 
launching such an attack should therefore lead to a 
severe punishment. There is also no doubt that break-
ing into a database is an offence that is comparable to 
breaking into a building. While the provisions of the 
German Criminal Code allow for the prosecution of 
such offences, international coordination on this issue 
is still insufficient. In order to avoid legal grey areas 
and to guarantee the rule of law also in cyber space, it 
is important to harmonise legal provisions on a global 
scale. 
Revising the German War Weapons Control Act:  A revi-
sion of the German War Weapons Act should be con-
sidered in order to extend its provisions to malware. 
Malware can be utilised for attacks against other states 
or their critical infrastructure and can cause similar 
damage as other war weapons. The export of such 
software should thus be controlled. The same goes for 
programs that are used by authoritarian states for sur-
veillance or for disrupting communication between 
opposition forces. Companies should disclose infor-
mation concerning the export of such programs. 
Drafting a global code of conduct for cyberspace:  In order 
to increase accountability, it is essential to draft a glo-
bal code of conduct for the Internet. This codex should 
apply to both states and non-governmental actors such 
as companies or individuals and clearly define differ-
ent types of cyber offences. These include attacking 
critical infrastructure, breaking into a database, acces-
sing or utilising private data without authorisation, as 
well as using software for espionage. So far, the US 
has blocked all efforts to formulate such a codex. Espe-
cially states with limited resources find it hard to 
accept the US resistance. As long as there is no global 
code of conduct, the technologically most advanced 
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state – the United States – is free to do what it wants 
in cyber space without having to face charges for 
its actions, whereas other states remain in a highly 
vulnerable position. 
If all of the measures listed above fail to have the 
desired impact (or to find enough support to be im-
plemented in the first place), this is likely to lead to 
calls for more a restricted Internet. In fact, the idea 
of limiting the reach of the Internet already has its 
supporters: while some argue simply that sensitive 
data should be kept off the Internet, others go as far 
as to demand that access to certain information 
should be denied altogether. At its most extreme, this 
strategy aims at complete isolation. Iran, for example, 
attempts to disconnect its national network from the 
global Internet in order to reduce the risk of cyber-
attacks against its (nuclear) industry. The self-imposed 
isolation also serves to curb the free flow of informa-
tion on the Internet and prevents the citizens from 
using the web for criticizing the government. Similar 
measures have been taken in China. 
Creating a nationally self-sufficient Internet system 
is a delicate political instrument and bears serious 
risks for individual liberties. Against this background, 
it appears all the more important to make progress in 
the five issue areas outlined above.101
 
 In order for the 
proposed measures to work, it is indispensable to 
involve private actors. At the same time, regulative 
strategies such as the planned EU strategy on cyber 
security cannot be measured only by their efficiency. 
Instead, they also have to fulfil the fundamental 
criteria of democratic governance: transparency, rule 
of law, accountability and participation. 
 
101  If states refuse to establish preventative norms, they 
put the entire Internet at risk. See Bruce Schneier, “Cyberwar 
Treaties”, Schneier on Security (Blog), 14 June 2012, http://www. 
schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/06/cyberwar_treati.html? 
utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=twitterfeed (accessed on 
26 June 2012). 
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Abbreviations 
 
ACTA Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
AFET Committee on Foreign Affairs/ 
Commission des affaires étrangères (EP) 
BBK Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und 
Katastrophenhilfe/Federal Office for Citizen 
Protection and Disaster Support 
BfV Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz/Federal Office for 
the Protection of the Constitution 
BND Bundesnachrichtendienst/Federal Intelligence 
Service 
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informations-
technik/Federal Office for Information Security 
CCD COE Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
CDMA Cyber Defence Management Authority 
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union/Christian 
Democratic Union 
CEPOL European Police College 
CERT Computer Emergency Response Team 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CIRP Committee for Internet-Related Policies (UN) 
COSI Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation 
on Internal Security 
CSU Christlich-Soziale Union/Christian Social Union of 
Bavaria 
EEAS European External Action Service 
EISAS European Information Sharing and Alert System 
EMSA European Maritime Safety Agency 
ENISA European Network and Information 
Security Agency 
EP European Parliament 
EP3R European Public-Private Partnership for Resilience 
EU European Union 
Eurojust European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit 
Europol European Police Office 
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei/Free Democratic Party 
FIRST Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams 
FS-ISAC Financial Services – Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center 
G8 Group of Eight 
G20 Group of Twenty 
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers 
ICSPA International Cyber Security Protection Alliance 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
IGCI Interpol Global Complex for Innovation 
IGF Internet Governance Forum 
IP Internet Protocol 
IT Information Technology 
ITR International Telecommunication Regulations 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
LIBE Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs (EP) 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCAZ Nationales Cyber-Abwehrzentrum/National Cyber 
Defense Center 
NCIRC TC Nato Computer Incident Response Capability – 
Technical Centre 
NSA National Security Agency 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 
OPC Observatory for the Prevention of Crime 
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in 
Europe 
PSC Political and Security Committee 
QANGO Quasi-autonomous Non-governmental Organization 
RFC Request for Comments 
RiR Regional Internet Registry 
SMS Short Message Service 
UN United Nations 
US United States of America 
W3C World Wide Web Consortium 
WCIT World Conference on International 
Telecommunications 
WSIS World Summit on the Information Society 
ZKA Zollkriminalamt/Customs Investigation Bureau 
